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Abstract
We develop a job search model in which some employers hold unobservable racial
prejudice toward black workers. Prejudiced employers may refuse to hire black workers
and may terminate them based on their prejudice. Workers do not observe employer
prejudice, but instead observe a signal of prejudice status, the presence of a black
supervisor. We show that jobs in firms with black supervisors hold higher option value
for black workers, because they are less likely to face prejudice-based termination.
Hence, black workers are willing to accept employment with lower expected match
quality from firms with black supervisors. We derive theoretical predictions on racial
differences in observed wages and job stability across supervisor races and variations
in local prejudice levels. We find empirical support for our predictions using unique
longitudinal data with information on the worker’s supervisor race matched with state-
level measures of prejudice.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we develop a new model of job search in which black workers respond to imper-
fect signals of employer prejudice prevailing in the local labor market and derive empirically
testable predictions on racial differences in wages and job stability. Using a unique dataset
matching local prejudice levels to information on workers’ wages, employment history, and
the race of their supervisors, we find empirical support for the model and its predictions.
Our findings provide new insight into the observed black-white differences in wages and
unemployment in the U.S.1
Our work builds on the taste-based discrimination framework that dates back to Becker
(1971). In Becker’s seminal work, prejudiced employers dislike hiring black workers, and to
offset their utility loss, they are only willing to hire black workers at a lower wage than whites.
However, in a perfectly competitive labor market, prejudice does not cause long-run wage
differentials, provided that there are enough unprejudiced employers in the labor market to
offer employment to black workers. Instead, as emphasized by Arrow (1972), employment
will be segregated, but there will be no long-run wage discrimination as unprejudiced firms
enter and growing demand for black workers eliminates wage differentials.
Subsequent research has shown, however, that racial wage differentials can persist when
there are search frictions (e.g., Black 1995, Bowlus and Eckstein 2002, Rosen 1997). A com-
mon prediction from these search models is that the existence of prejudiced employers in
the labor market lowers the arrival rate of job offers to blacks. Because search is costly,
black workers are thus willing to set a lower reservation wage or match quality for accept-
ing employment. The search framework can also facilitate predictions about employment
differences between black and white workers. Compared to wage differentials, much less
attention has been paid to racial gaps in employment, despite the fact that the size of the
unexplained employment gap is substantially larger than the wage gap (e.g., Stratton 1993,
Johnson and Neal 1998, Ritter and Taylor 2011; Lang and Lehmann 2012). The existence of
such large, unexplained black-white differentials in employment indicates that disentangling
factors contributing to racially varying frictions in the labor market is important for better
understanding the persistence of racial inequalities in labor market outcomes.
Our model introduces an additional friction: information about whether a prospective
employer is prejudiced. In our random search model, worker’s productivity on the job (or
1Racial disparities in the U.S. labor market are well-documented. In the 2000s, year-round full-time
employed black men earned less than 80% of that earned by white men and faced more than double the
rate of unemployment (Lang and Lehmann, 2012). A substantial portion of this wage gap can be attributed
to differences in skill (Neal and Johnson, 1996), yet a sizable wage gap still remains even accounting for
observable differences in education and cognitive test scores especially among low-skill workers (e.g., Carneiro,
Heckman, and Masterov 2005, Lang and Manove 2011, Bjerk 2006, and Black et al. 2006).
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match quality) is initially unobserved by both worker and firm. However, upon meeting,
they receive a signal of the true productivity, and workers are paid their expected product
until the uncertainty is resolved. After one period on the job, match quality is revealed.
If the match is poor, it is terminated and the worker returns to unemployment. Employer
prejudice manifests itself in two ways. First, similar to Black (1995), prejudiced firms may
sometimes refuse to offer employment to blacks upon matching. Second, prejudiced firms
have biased retention policies in which blacks are laid-off at higher rates than white workers
even if the match is revealed to be highly productive. When workers meet an employer
during their job search, they do not observe whether the employer is prejudiced.2 However,
they do observe the presence of a black supervisor at the firm, which serves as a signal of
the employer’s prejudice status.
Given these sources of information frictions and features of employer prejudice, our
model predicts that black workers are willing to accept lower wages from firms with black
supervisors, because black workers have greater confidence that they will not be terminated.
In other words, jobs from unprejudiced firms provide black workers with a greater option
value; if the job is revealed to be a better match than the worker had initially expected, he
or she will not lose future wage benefits as a result of prejudice-based termination.
From this intuitive result, we derive several new empirically testable predictions about
wage and employment differentials between black and white workers across supervisor race
and prejudice levels. First, black workers will have lower average wages in jobs with a black
supervisor. However, they will be compensated for their lower wages with longer employment
spells. In other words, although black workers are willing to accept “riskier” jobs with worse
match quality signals from firms with black supervisors, the jobs they accept will provide
them with lower expected termination risk (i.e., greater option value). Second, as the pro-
portion of prejudiced employers increases in the local labor market, the expected termination
risk from employers without black supervisors increases and the wage and job stability effects
are magnified. Our model predicts that as prejudice levels rise in the local labor market, the
average wage and job stability of black workers in jobs with black supervisors will decrease,
and black workers’ wage gap between jobs with black and white supervisors will increase.
We test these predictions using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort
2There are many reasons to think that receiving a job offer does not preclude a black worker from facing
prejudice on the job. For example, the hiring officer may be unprejudiced, but the supervisor may be
prejudiced. Implicit Association Tests have also shown that many individuals who do not believe they are
prejudiced could still possess subconscious prejudices which may impact the employment relationship. See,
for example, Ziegert and Hanges (2005), Bertrand, Chugh and Mullainathan (2005), and Rooth (2007).
Lehmann (2011) finds that law firms use affirmative action in hiring but not in task assignment; as a
consequence they hire blacks at higher rates, but assign them to tasks that do not build human capital, and
therefore promote them to partner at lower rates than whites.
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(NLSY97) and the General Social Survey (GSS) and find empirical support for them. Using
the confidential geocode variables for both datasets, we construct the rate at which people
report prejudiced beliefs by state and match these measures of prejudice to workers in the
NLSY97 living in these states. The NLSY97 provides data on supervisor’s race for most
of the panel, allowing us to examine wages and employment patterns for black and white
workers across jobs with different supervisor races or local prejudice.
Likely due to limited data on supervisor race and prejudice levels, there have been
only a few studies on the impact of prejudice levels or employer/supervisor’s race on labor
market outcomes. Closely related to our work is that of Charles and Guryan (2008) in which
they test predictions of the canonical Becker model. Using measures of prejudice from the
GSS, they find empirical support for the prediction that prejudice levels of the “marginally
prejudiced” firm in the state can explain wage differences between black and white workers.3
Fadlon (2015) uses the NLSY97 to test a model of statistical discrimination in which black
employers observe black workers’ skill levels with better accuracy than white employers. He
finds that the correlation between wage and skills is stronger for workers who have a same
race supervisor. Finally, using personnel data from a single firm, Giuliano et al. (2009, 2011)
show that black managers disproportionately hire blacks relative to managers of other races,
and that black workers under black managers have better career trajectories.
Our work differs from these studies in several important aspects. First, our model focuses
on the role of imperfect information about employer prejudice in job search and labor market
outcomes. Second, rather than equating supervisor’s race with that of the hiring officer,
we assume that the presence of a black supervisor provides a signal of the prejudice a
worker may face on the job. Third, we assume that all employers observe the match quality
signal of workers with equal precision. Finally, our model yields unique predictions on racial
differences in wages and job stability across employers and labor markets with varying levels
of prejudice.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our
model of search with unobservable employer prejudice and match quality and derive our
main predictions. We describe the data in Section 3 and present results from our empirical
tests in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
3Charles and Guryan (2011) extend this analysis by showing that, despite decreases in the average level
of prejudice in the U.S. over the past half-century, there has been little change in the level of prejudice held
by the marginally prejudiced individuals who are most likely to interact with blacks given the segregation
implied by Becker’s model.
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2 Model of Search and Racial Matches in Employment
In this section, we outline a tractable model of search and racial matches in employment to
illustrate our ideas formally and to motivate our empirical work.
In summary, prejudiced firms are biased at both hiring and retention stages: they are
less likely to make job offers to black workers and are also less likely to retain black workers
after hiring. The presence of prejudice firms, therefore, decreases job arrival rates for black
workers, which makes them less selective in accepting employment opportunities in general.
The expected lower retention rates decrease the option value of jobs that come from poten-
tially prejudiced firms. Workers cannot observe precisely which firms are prejudiced, but
they do observe an imperfect but informative signal that indicates some firms are unpreju-
diced. In practice, the signal of employer prejudice could take many forms. In our model
and in the data, the signal is assumed to be the presence of a black supervisor at the firm.
Given that black workers face higher termination risk from firms without black supervisors,
these jobs hold lower option value for them. Thus, black workers are more selective about
accepting jobs at firms without black supervisors. Our theoretical model below formalizes
this intuition, and we derive empirically testable predictions on wages and job stability.
2.1 Primitives
We begin with a two-period model with two groups of agents: workers and firms.
Workers: Workers differ in their race (black or white), but are otherwise identical. They
are risk neutral and do not discount the future.
Firms: Firms are either prejudiced or unprejudiced, with p ∈ (0, 1) representing the frac-
tion of prejudiced firms in the economy. We take this distribution and the associated hiring
and retention practices of firms as exogenous. Although we believe that understanding how
a firm chooses its hiring and retention policies is an important and understudied factor in
contributing to labor market racial disparities, our data are not suited for analyzing the
determination of such firm behavior.
A prejudiced firm employs a biased hiring and retention process:
• When it meets a black worker, it declines to make him a job offer with probability
s ∈ (0, 1).
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• When it employs a black worker, it terminates him after each period with probability
s.
A fraction b ∈ (0, 1) of non-prejudiced firms have a black supervisor, which indicates that
they are not prejudiced with certainty. As such, prejudiced firms do not have black supervi-
sors.
Given these primitives, using Bayes’ Rule, we can calculate the probability of that a firm is
prejudiced given that it only has white supervisors:
Prob(prejudiced|white supervisor) = p
p+ (1− p)(1− b) . (1)
The probability that a white supervisor-only firm is prejudiced given that it has made an
offer to a black worker is then:
pi ≡ Prob(prejudiced|white supervisor, offer to black) = p(1− s)
p(1− s) + (1− p)(1− b) . (2)
Match-Specific Productivity and Wages: Worker’s productivity is entirely match-
specific and is either good or bad. Good matches produce ω and bad matches produce
0. Upon meeting, the worker and firm commonly observe a signal q, which represents
the probability that the match quality is good. This signal is distributed according to a
continuous and twice-differentiable pdf f(q) over [0, 1] throughout the population of potential
matches. When necessary to facilitate empirically testable predictions, we will assume that
q is uniform. After the worker is employed for one period, the match quality is revealed to
both workers and firms. We assume that wages are always equal to the (expected) marginal
product. This assumption is not strictly necessary. What we require is that firms are not
able to signal their prejudice status through their wage offer.4
Model Timing: We outline the timing of our model graphically in Figure 1. In period 1,
each worker is matched with a firm. If the firm makes an offer to the worker and the worker
accepts, the worker earns qω. Otherwise, the worker remains unemployed and earns h, the
4While this requirement may have its limitations, this wage structure has been imposed previously in
search settings with evolving information (e.g. Fryer, Pager, and Spenkuch, 2013). We note that a wage-
setting policy which revealed a firm’s prejudice status would almost certainly involve firms posting wages
that were different for blacks and whites for the same job, which is illegal under United States law. However,
in many non-cooperative bargaining settings, individuals can learn about information initially known only by
the other party through, for example, strategic delays, strikes, etc. (Kennan and Wilson, 1993). Of course,
these issues could be avoided if we assumed that firms did not know that they were prejudiced at the time
of the wage offer, but we do not want to rely on such a strong assumption here.
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value of home production, with ω > h > 0. In period 2, unemployed workers are matched
with a firm. Again, if they receive an offer and accept they earn qω, otherwise they remain
unemployed and earn h. After this matching has occurred, firms and employed workers learn
the quality of their match from the previous period. If the match is revealed to be bad, the
worker is dismissed (or the worker leaves voluntarily), and he returns to unemployment to
earn h. If the match is revealed to good, the worker is retained, and she earns ω with the
exception of some black workers who are dismissed with probability of s by prejudiced firms.
In other words, the implicit cost of accepting a job offer in period 1 is that the worker loses
the opportunity to search for a job in period 2 if the match terminates.
2.2 White Workers
We first analyze the behavior of white workers. As whites do not face prejudice, they act as
our baseline case against which we can compare the impact of prejudice on black workers.
Working backwards from the end of period 2, we know that a worker who enters period
2 unemployed and remains unemployed receives h, while a worker who accepts an offer in
period 2 with match quality q earns qω. It then follows that the worker will accept any offer
for period 2 employment with a match quality greater than qrw2 , where
qrw2 =
h
ω
. (3)
The superscript rw denotes the reservation wage for white workers, and the subscript number
denotes the period in which the employment begins.
If a white worker enters period 2 unemployed, she receives an offer with probability 1.
Thus, their value of unemployment in period 2 is
Uw2 = ω [1− F (qrw2 )]E(q|q ≥ qrw2 ) + F (qrw2 )h. (4)
Substituting for qrw2 , equation (4) simplifies to
Uw2 = h+
ˆ 1
h
ω
q′ω − hdF (q′)
= h+ ω
ˆ 1
h
ω
1− F (q′)dq′. (5)
If a white worker accepts an offer in period 1, he receives his expected marginal product,
and advances to period 2 employed. Then, if the match is revealed to be good, he receives
ω, which occurs with probability q. If the match is bad, it is terminated and he earns h.
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Recall that workers who accept an offer in period 1 are not able to search in period 2 if they
lose their job. Therefore, the value of a job offer in period 1 with a match quality signal q is
V w1 (q) = qω + qω + (1− q)h
= 2qω + (1− q)h. (6)
If a worker does not accept an offer in period 1, she receives h, advances to period 2, and
receives Uw2 . Therefore, it follows that she will accept any offer such that V
w
1 (q) ≥ h + Uw2 .
This occurs when
q ≥ 1
2ω − h
(
h+ ω
ˆ 1
h
ω
1− F (q′)dq′
)
≡ qrw1 , (7)
which represents the zero prejudice baseline reservation match quality signal for accepting a
job offer in period 1.
2.3 Black Workers
We now turn to the strategy of black workers. As with white workers, black workers who
enter period 2 unemployed receive qω if they accept a job with probability q of being a
good match, and h if they remain unemployed. Thus, they follow an identical reservation q
strategy to that of white workers:
qrb2 =
h
ω
. (8)
Note that prejudice does not enter the decision here, because the time horizon of model is
finite. As there is no period 3, there are no concerns about involuntary termination.
However, prejudice does affect the job acceptance decision in period 1. Suppose that a
black worker enters period 2 unemployed. With probability p, she will encounter a prejudiced
firm, and with probability s, a prejudiced firm will refuse to offer her employment.5 Thus,
the value of unemployment is
U b2 = ω(1− ps)
[
1− F (qrb2 )
]
E(q|q ≥ qrb2 ) +
[
ps+ (1− ps)F (qrb2 )
]
h (9)
5Note that supervisor race does not matter for jobs offered at this stage, as workers are unconcerned
about future termination risk due to the finiteness of the model.
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Substituting for qrb2 , equation (9) simplifies to
U b2 = h+ (1− ps)
ˆ 1
h
ω
q′ω − hdF (q′)
= h+ ω(1− ps)
ˆ 1
h
ω
1− F (q′)dq′. (10)
Note that due to the probability of ps that they will not receive a job offer, black workers
have a lower value of unemployment than whites.
In period 1, black workers may receive a job offer from either a black supervisor firm
or a white supervisor firm. The former firms are unprejudiced with certainty, and therefore
any separations from this job which would occur in period 2 are voluntary. Thus the value
of a job offer from a black supervisor firm is
V bb1 (q) = qω + qω + (1− q)h
= 2qω + (1− q)h, (11)
where the superscript refers to the value black workers derive from jobs with black super-
visors. Note that this value function is identical to that of white workers. Both white and
black workers with black supervisors experience no prejudice-based termination risk. If a
black worker receives a job offer from a black supervisor firm, he will accept if and only if
V bb1 (q) ≥ U b2 + h, which occurs when
q ≥ 1
2ω − h
(
h+ ω(1− ps)
ˆ 1
h
ω
1− F (q′)dq′
)
≡ qrbb1 , (12)
where qrbb1 represents the period 1 black worker reservation match probability for black
supervisor jobs. Despite valuing jobs identically conditional on q, black workers are less
selective in the offers they accept from black supervisors than white workers, because they
have a lower value of entering period 2 unemployed.
This is not the case for job offers from white supervisor firms. Because some white
supervisor firms are prejudiced, and prejudiced firms sometimes make employment offers to
black workers, there is a probability pi (derived in equation (2)) that if a black worker accepts
an offer from a white supervisor firm, they will have a prejudiced employer. If their employer
is prejudiced, they will be terminated in period 2 with probability s and be forced return to
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home production. Thus, the expected value of these jobs is
V bw1 (q) = qω + q(1− pis)ω + [(1− q) + qpis]h
= (2− pis)qω + [1− q(1− pis)]h. (13)
Conditional on q, the value of white supervisor jobs to black workers is strictly lower than
the value of black supervisor jobs to black workers and the value of employment to white
workers, because there is a pis probability that they will lose a good job due to a prejudice-
based termination. If they receive a job offer from a white supervisor firm in period 1, they
will accept it so long as V bw1 (q) ≥ U b2 + h, which occurs whenever
q ≥ 1
(2ω − h)− pis(ω − h)
(
h+ ω(1− ps)
ˆ 1
h
ω
1− F (q′)dq′
)
≡ qrbw1 . (14)
Note that since ω > h, qrbw1 > q
rbb
1 . Relative to jobs with black supervisors, black workers
have a higher reservation match quality signal q for jobs with white supervisors. This is
because jobs with white supervisors hold lower option value for black workers. As they have
pis probability of losing their job when it is a good match, black workers compensate for this
increased risk by only accepting white supervisor jobs when they have a relatively higher
initial wage (and higher chance of being a good match).
To summarize, prejudice decreases the value of unemployment for black workers relative
to white workers, which in turn, induces them to accept less valuable employment opportu-
nities. However, the threat of prejudice reduces the value of employment opportunities for
black workers at firms with white supervisors. Thus, they are more selective with respect to
the match quality signals on job offers from white supervisors than black supervisors.
2.4 Comparative Statics: Supervisor Race
The results of Section 2.3 allow us to develop a rich set of empirical predictions on the
behavior of black workers across firms which do and do not have an observable black super-
visor, which we outline here. When the results we present include weak inequalities, it is
only because workers ignore supervisor’s race in period 2 when accepting job offers given the
finite time horizon.
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2.4.1 Predictions on Wages
Proposition 1. Conditional on tenure and potential experience, black workers with white
supervisors earn (weakly) higher wages on average than black workers with black supervisors.6
As we have shown in Section 2.3, black workers have a higher reservation match quality
signal q for jobs with white supervisors than black supervisors, as there is a greater threat of
termination from white supervisor firms. Thus, the accepted wages for black workers with
white supervisors is drawn from a strictly higher distribution than the accepted wages of
black workers with black supervisors.
Proposition 2. Conditional on tenure and potential experience, the average wage of black
workers with black supervisors (weakly) decreases as prejudice increases.
As the fraction of prejudiced firms increases in the labor market, the job arrival rate for
black workers decreases, because prejudiced employers sometimes refuse to make job offers
to black workers. The reduction in job arrivals rates decreases the value of unemployment for
black workers, and hence, black workers lower their reservation match quality signal for jobs
with black supervisors. As the lower limit of match quality signals associated with accepted
jobs with black supervisors decreases, the average wage of black workers decreases as well.
Proposition 3. Assume that q is distributed uniformly over [0, 1]. Conditional on tenure
and potential experience, the difference in mean wages between black workers with white
supervisors and black workers with black supervisors is (weakly) increasing in the level of
prejudice, so long as prejudice among white supervisor firms is not too pervasive. A sufficient
condition for this property to hold is (1− b)(1− 2ps) > p2s(b− s).7
Proposition 3 is perhaps our model’s most surprising wage result. When the fraction
of prejudiced firms increases in the labor market, the wage gap between workers with black
supervisors and workers with white supervisors actually increases. The intuition for this
result is the following. As prejudice increases, the value of unemployment decreases, which
6Proofs of this proposition and all other results can be found in Appendix A.
7For Proposition 3 and others which require q to be uniformly distributed, we first prove our result at
the reservation match quality, and then must make a distributional assumption to ensure that the change
in reservation match qualities affects the average wages in the same way. Although the exact condition
will vary with the distribution of match quality, we will be able to prove a similar result under other
distributional assumptions, so long as the distribution does not have too much curvature in the range
around the reservation values. Problematic cases would arise if there is a large mass in the area round the
white supervisor reservation match quality, and none around the black supervisor match quality. Then,
black workers will indeed become relatively less selective in the job offers they take from black supervisors,
but given there are few new black supervisor jobs with poor match quality that workers accept, the average
accepted wage is unchanged.
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induces black workers to become less selective on the jobs they accept. For black supervisor
jobs, this response simply requires a reduction in qrbb1 . However, increase in the number of
prejudiced firms also increases the probability that white supervisor firms are prejudiced,
which increases the prejudiced-based termination risk and decreases the value of white su-
pervisor jobs, even holding qrbw1 constant. Thus, an equal reduction in reservation job value
due to an increase in prejudice levels will generally involve a larger decrease in qrbb1 than q
rbw
1 .
One exception to the result described in Proposition 3 is when workers are fairly certain
that white supervisor firms are prejudiced (i.e., pi is very high) which generally occurs for large
values of b and p. In this case, the termination risk from a white supervisor job is sufficiently
high that changes in the match quality signal have very little marginal impact on the value
of accepting the job. Regardless of the initial match quality, jobs with a white supervisor
will likely be terminated after one period. Since the worker must be indifferent between
unemployment and employment at the reservation match quality signal, large downward
adjustments in the reservation match quality signal for white supervisors are required when
prejudice changes slightly. However, the parameters required for this proposition to fail
are unrealistic in our current society. Proposition 3 would hold even if 75% of firms were
prejudiced and 50% of unprejudiced firms employed a black supervisor, which are well above
estimates from this current paper and other studies.8
2.4.2 Predictions on Job Stability
Our model also generates predictions on job stability.
Proposition 4. Assume that q is distributed uniformly over [0, 1]. Conditional on starting
potential experience, black workers have (weakly) more stable matches (longer job durations)
in jobs with black supervisors than with white supervisors.
Although black workers have a lower reservation match quality signal for accepting jobs
with black supervisors, it is never sufficiently low so as to offset the termination risk posed
from white supervisor jobs. At the reservation wages, workers are indifferent between offers
from white supervisor firms and black supervisor firms. Since white supervisor job wages
8Structural estimates from Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) imply that 56% of firms have some prejudice
against hiring blacks. Using our own measures of prejudice, we do not observe a level of prejudice above
75% in any region other than the South, and only on the weakest question of prejudice. Lang and Lehmann
(2012) draw on similar surveys of social attitudes to conclude that widespread “strong prejudice” cannot be
a credible foundation for a discrimination model, although the prejudice in our model may be more similar
to their idea of “weak prejudice.” Giuliano et. al (2009) report that 6.6% of retail managers in the Consumer
Population Survey are black, and 5.9% of managers within the particular firm for which they have data.
In our model, if 75% of firms were prejudiced and 50% of non-prejudiced firms employed black supervisors,
then 12.5% of white workers should have a black supervisor. However, in our data, white workers encounter
black supervisors during only 8% of their job-spells.
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are higher at the reservation match probabilities, it must be that black supervisor jobs are
more stable.
Proposition 5. Conditional on starting potential experience, the stability of black workers’
matches with black supervisor firms (weakly) decreases as prejudice increases.
This result follows from Proposition 2. Black workers accept black supervisor jobs with
lower probabilities of being good matches as prejudice increases, leading to greater number
of bad matches and turnover.
Proposition 6. Assume that q is distributed uniformly over [0, 1]. Conditional on start-
ing potential experience, the stability of black workers’ matches with white supervisor firms
(weakly) decreases as prejudice increases.
The effect of prejudice on the average wage of black workers with white supervisors is
ambiguous; the effect on job stability is not. As discussed before, an increase in prejudice
levels increases the probability that white supervisor firms are prejudiced, which in turn,
increases the termination risk at these jobs. Although black workers can compensate for this
risk increase by becoming more selective on the quality of jobs they accept, prejudice increases
also decrease the value of unemployment. Thus, black workers are unwilling to increase their
reservation match quality sufficiently to completely offset this increase in termination risk.
2.5 Comparative Statics: Worker Race
We can also compare the results derived in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 to generate predictions across
worker race.
Proposition 7. Conditional on tenure and potential experience, black workers in jobs with
black supervisors have (weakly) lower wages and (weakly) less job stability than white workers.
As shown in Section 2.3, black workers have lower reservation match quality signals for
jobs with black supervisors than white workers, and thus, the distribution of accepted black
worker-black supervisor match qualities is strictly lower. This fact directly implies that black
workers in jobs with black supervisors will have both lower wages and less job stability than
whites.
Note that black workers in jobs with white supervisors will not necessarily have lower
wages than whites. The relative wages of black and white workers in white supervisor jobs
will depend on the fraction of prejudiced firms, the probability of arbitrary termination,
and the informativeness of the supervisor’s race. For example, if supervisor race is very
informative of employer prejudice, and therefore, termination risk to black workers from
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white supervisors is very high, black workers will only accept jobs from white supervisor
firms with a very high q. This would lead to very few black worker-white supervisor job
matches, but these jobs would pay higher wages conditional on tenure than those earned
by a typical white worker. However, because of the impact of prejudice on termination
probability, the reservation job will always be less stable.
Proposition 8. Assume that q is distributed uniformly over [0, 1]. Conditional on starting
potential experience, black workers have on average (weakly) less job stability than white
workers regardless of supervisor race.
When black workers have a lower reservation match quality with white supervisors than
whites, it of course follows that their job stability will be lower. It is also true even when
black workers have a higher reservation match quality than white workers. The reservation
match quality is the signal at which the worker is just indifferent between accepting the job
and being unemployed. Since the value of being unemployed is lower for blacks, their value
of employment at the reservation match quality must also be lower; if qrbw1 > q
rw
1 , it must
be the case that qrbw1 (1− pis) < qrw1 . Our model thus generates the empirical prediction that
black workers have less job stability than whites.
3 Data: NLSY97 and GSS
We test these predictions from our model using data from the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) and the General Social Survey (GSS).
3.1 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997
The NLSY97 surveys a sample of individuals who were aged 12 to 17 in 1997 annually on a
wide array of topics including scholastic aptitude, family characteristics, and labor market
outcomes. Of most interest to us are the annual job surveys. In each year, the NLSY97
tracks all jobs in which the respondent worked in the previous year and allows these jobs
to be linked across survey years. Hence, we can measure the duration of employment for
jobs which were terminated within the follow-up periods of the sample. Importantly for our
purposes, the NLSY97 also includes of information on the race of the individual’s supervisor
(self-reported) for each job until the 2009 wave of the survey. This variable allows us to
estimate the effect of supervisor race on wages and job stability and to test the predictions
from our model.
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3.2 General Social Survey
The GSS is a biannual survey of social attitudes conducted on a nationally representative
sample in the United States.9 Included in this survey are various questions assessing indi-
viduals’ racial attitudes with which we can measure local levels of prejudice. We combine
cross-sectional samples from the 1996-2010 waves of the GSS and calculate the fraction of
white individuals who hold certain race-associated beliefs at the state-level.
3.3 Measure of Prejudice
Prejudice in our model is specifically defined as a distaste for black workers that is strong
enough to induce the employer to make employment decisions on the basis of race. Although
the GSS asks questions about a variety of racial attitudes, none directly addresses attitudes
towards black workers in the workplace. Thus, we view responses to each of these ques-
tions related to racial attitudes as measures that are positively correlated with employment
prejudice and measured with error. If we define pk as the rate of employment prejudice in
state k and mjk, j ∈ {1, ..J} as J measures of prejudice in the GSS, then we can relate these
measures by10
mjk = αjpk + jk (15)
Under the assumptions that E[jklk] = 0, ∀j 6= l and E[pkjk] = 0, we can estimate pk up
to a positive scalar using standard factor analysis.11
We restrict our attention to questions that we felt best measure racial animus rather
than political sentiments.12 From this subset, we select a diverse set of four questions for
9The Survey was conducted every year from 1972 to 1994 (except in 1979, 1981, and 1992). Since then,
it has been conducted biannually.
10One way to interpret this relation would be that αj is the rate at which an individual who holds
employment prejudice p also holds belief mj . Values of αj > 1 then indicate that only some individuals who
hold mj would display prejudice in employment decisions, while values of αj < 1 would indicate that there
are additional individuals in the population who would display prejudice in employment decisions beyond
those who express mjk.
11Factor analysis is an increasingly common tool used to estimate latent variable models in economics. It
has been used, for example, to estimate college quality (Black and Smith, 2006), the skill content of jobs
(Bacolod, Blum, and Strange, 2009), parental investment (Aizer and Cunha, 2012), and the prevalence of
crack cocaine (Fryer Jr. et al., 2013). It is also frequently used to estimate cognitive and non-cognitive
human capital in a dynamic setting. See, for example, Cunha and Heckman (2008), Cunha, Heckman, and
Schennach (2010), and Sarzosa (2015). Charles and Guryan (2008) take great care to measure prejudice as
the “marginally prejudiced individual” which is the relevant measure for the predictions of Becker’s friction-
less model. We intentionally measure prejudice differently, as in our model with market frictions the relevant
measure of prejudice is the fraction of prejudiced employers, which is identified up to a positive scalar multiple
by factor analysis under the set of assumptions we laid out.
12For example, we did not consider a question on whether a racist book should be removed from a library,
as this may elicit one’s attitude towards free speech. We also did not consider any of the numerous questions
that relate to attitudes on affirmative action, which may provoke responses based on one’s political ideology.
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mj, each of which was asked in every wave of the survey from 1996-2010: 1) whether they
believe racial disparities are due to blacks’ “lack of will,” 2) whether they believe racial
disparities are not due to discrimination, 3) whether they would be opposed to a close
family member marrying a black individual, and 4) whether they believe racial disparities
are due to “inborn disability.”13 In practice, the choice of questions is of little consequence
to our results.14 There is substantial variation across states in the propensity to respond
positively to each of these questions; when we estimate a regression of individual responses
to each question on a set of state of residence indicators, we can strongly reject the equality
of the coefficients on these indicators in every case.
We calculate the fraction of prejudiced responses for each question at the state-level.
We exclude a small number of states for which we do not have at least 30 respondents on
each question. This exclusion leaves us with measures of prejudice for 43 states, calculated
off of an average of 208 individuals in each state. To avoid confounding our measures
with time trends in prejudice, we adjust each state’s yearly prejudice rates using a common
national time trend.15 We then use these measures to estimate the factor model.16 Following
convention, we normalize our prejudice measure to be mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across
states.17
In Table 1, we report (un-weighted) averages for these racial attitudes and our prejudice
measure by census division.18 Prejudice appears to be highest in the South (divisions 5-7),
particularly in the East South Central (division 6) which consists of Alabama, Kentucky,
Mississippi, and Tennessee. The New England (division 1), Mountain (division 8), and Pacific
(division 9) regions appear to have the least prejudice, although the ordering depends on
the question. Our prejudice measure matches the conclusions one would draw from the
underlying questions, with the highest prejudice levels in the South and the lowest prejudice
levels in New England and the West. We also observe substantial variation in prejudice levels
13For a detailed description of these questions, see the Appendix B.
14See Appendix C.2 for results from a large set of alternative measures of prejudice from the GSS.
15We first calculate the fraction in each state who respond affirmatively to each question in each wave of
the survey. We than estimate a linear time-trend in these data, and subtract the trend from each state-year
estimate before combining the years to create one state measure.
16The factor loadings are lack of will (.92), no discrimination (.78), oppose marriage of close family member
(.84), and inborn differences (.55).
17We note here that p in our model is more accurately defined as the rate of prejudice held by employers,
while we can only measure this for the population at large. This would be a concern if the relationship
between prejudice held by the population and prejudice held by employers differed systematically across
states in a way that was correlated with local labor market conditions. While it is difficult to test directly
for this in the GSS, we see little differences across states in the relationship between real income and responses
on our individual prejudice questions, suggesting that this is not likely to be a major concern.
18The number of states in a census division ranges from 3 (Division 2) to 8 (Division 5). For confidentiality
reasons, we are not permitted to display descriptive statistics at a level that is less aggregated than 3 states.
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within each census division; the standard deviation of state-level prejudice measure is less
than 0.5 in only two of the nine divisions. To provide a context for interpreting these prejudice
magnitudes, a one standard deviation increase in the prejudice measure corresponds roughly
to moving from the Mountain states (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Montana,
Utah, Nevada, and Wyoming) to the East North Central (Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio,
and Wisconsin).
3.4 Supervisor Race, Wages, and Job Spells
We use the geocode files to match these prejudice measures with the individuals in the
NSLY97 to create a panel of jobs, supervisor race, and levels of prejudice for the state in
which the worker lives. Supervisor race is of particular importance. Throughout a job spell,
workers often work under different supervisors of different races.19 As we view supervisor
race as a signal of employer prejudice to workers, we are interested in supervisor race as a
measure the prevalence of blacks in observable authority positions in a firm. We, therefore,
record a worker as working for a firm with a black supervisor if we ever observe them working
with a black supervisor during that job spell. In this sense, we can think of our variable
as a noisy measure of whether the employer employs any blacks in supervisory positions.20
Because our measure is forward-looking, this measure presents a problem for jobs the surveys
after 2008 that do not include the supervisor race question. We, therefore, exclude these
years from our analysis.
We drop all job-year observations with reported wages less than $1 per hour or above
$100 per hour, job-years with less than 30 hours or more than 80 hours of work per week,
and job-years before an individual has completed his education.21 We drop individuals who
report less than 9 years of education and keep only white and black individuals to focus
our attention on the black-white wage and employment gap. Likewise, we drop job spells
where we observe non-white, non-black supervisors in each year, and job spells for which
we never observe supervisor’s race. These restrictions yield a sample with 27,660 job-year
19For instance, in our data, 4% of white workers work under a black supervisor at a given point in time,
but 8% of white workers are employed in a job spell where they have in the past or will in the future work
under a black supervisor.
20Since all job spells are finite, and assuming most supervisors are white, our measure is biased towards
0 (having a white supervisor). Further, this bias will be greater for shorter job spells, as we have less time
to infer the composition of the firm’s hierarchy. As we will discuss later, these limitations should only be a
problem for our analysis if we believe this bias differs in magnitude for white and black workers conditional
on supervisor race. We will also explore robustness of our results to measures of supervisor race that do not
suffer from potential correlation between the bias and job spell duration.
21A small number of workers report starting jobs very early in their lifetime (in some cases even before
they were born). We drop all jobs that are reported as having started before age 14 even if they pass our
hours restrictions, as these likely represent data errors that can distort our tenure measure.
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observations, 27,185 of which are in states where we have a measure of prejudice.
In Table 2, we show descriptive statistics of our sample broken down by race. To avoid
over-weighting jobs with very short spells, we weight each observation by the number of
days the worker was employed in that position in a given year.22 Thus, we can view our
results as representative of the average job a worker worked in a given year. Consistent with
previous research, blacks earn lower wages, have lower average education, have shorter job
durations, score in the lower percentiles on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude and
Battery (ASVAB), and have a higher implied female labor force participation rate.23 There
is a startling amount of implied segregation by supervisor race. Only 8% of white workers
work at an establishment in which they will encounter a black supervisor, compared to 54%
of black workers. Black workers live, on average, in areas with higher rates of prejudice.24
While the difference in responses on each individual question is small, it amounts to a 0.47
standard deviation difference in overall prejudice. This is roughly equivalent to the difference
in prejudice between the East North Central and the South Atlantic (Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West
Virginia.)
In Table 3, we break down our sample by supervisor race. Black supervisors’ workers earn
lower wages, are less educated, and score in lower percentiles of the ASVAB than those who
work for white supervisors. However, this is likely because black workers account for 77%
of black supervisor job-years, compared to just 20% of white supervisor job-years. Similar
to black workers, the average worker in a job spell with a a black supervisor lives in a state
with a 0.42 standard deviation higher level of prejudice.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Wage Effects
In this section, we test the key predictions of our model along two dimensions: wage and job
stability. We first examine how wages vary across supervisor race. Our main specification
22Because the NLSY97 is a panel, we use the interview dates to calculate the number of days of employment
at a firm each observation represents for jobs that were held over multiple surveys. We weight all jobs that
were worked for more than 365 days between surveys (either due to the survey being not quite annual or
because the worker did not respond in a previous survey year) as if they were worked for exactly 365 days.
Our results are not sensitive to this modification, and are robust to weighting all jobs equally.
23Previous research has shown that the labor force participation decisions of women differ across race
(Neal, 2004). Restricting our sample to only males yields similar results.
24As workers may sometimes switch states of residence during a job spell, we measure prejudice only
through the state they resided in when they first report the spell. This is primarily a concern during the
final year of the spell, where the job may have ended because the worker moved to a new location.
18
estimates a pooled regression model of
logWi = βXi + γ1b
w
i + γ2b
e
i + γ3b
w
i b
e
i + εi, (16)
where Xi is a vector of job- and worker-specific controls, b
w
i is an indicator equal to one if the
worker is black, bei is an indicator equal to one if the employer is a black supervisor estab-
lishment, and εi is the econometric error term. The coefficient γ1 represents the conditional
black-white wage gap among white supervisors. The coefficient γ2 represents the conditional
difference in wages between workers with black supervisors and white supervisors for white
workers. The coefficient γ3 represents the conditional difference in the “supervisor wage gap”
for black workers relative to whites.
There are inevitably unobservable differences between establishments that employ black
supervisors and those that do not, and these differences will likely be correlated with wage.
Although we have several employer characteristics in the NLSY97 to use as controls, it is
unlikely that they can fully account for these differences. Our identifying assumption is
that the remaining unobservable factors influence the wages of blacks and whites equally.
Our model assumes that the establishment-level prejudice should not influence the wages
of whites, and hence the effect of unobservable establishment differences on wages will be
accounted for by γ2.
25 Our model’s first prediction (Proposition 1) is then γ3 < 0: blacks
accept positions with lower wages to work at firms with a strong black presence in supervisor
roles.
We report our results on wages in Table 4.26 In column (1), we estimate a standard
Mincer regression with controls for education, gender, and quartics in experience and tenure.
Black workers whom we only observe with white supervisors earn about 12% less than white
workers with white supervisors. Interestingly, white wages do not vary with supervisor
race once controlling for worker characteristics, which suggests unobservable firm differences
across supervisor race may not be too severe. Consistent with our model, blacks earn 5.1
percent less in firms observed with black supervisors (relative to whites) than in firms with
white supervisors.
To control for differences in geographic dispersion by race, we include state and year
fixed effects in column (2). Our results remain unchanged. In column (3), we account for
differences in job quality by controlling for industry and occupation fixed effects, the log of
establishment size, and indicators for whether the worker receives any job benefits, whether
25One concern is that γ2 could be picking up white workers’ tastes for segregated firms or same-race
management. As we will discuss in a later section, the data do not appear to support this interpretation.
26As there are likely common shocks to individual wages, we cluster our standard errors at the individual
level. This formulation allows errors to be correlated within a job spell, the unit of variation of our main
variable of interest.
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he is a member of a union, and whether he has employer sponsored health insurance.27 Our
main parameter of interest remains negative and statistically significant. Finally, to fur-
ther account for individual heterogeneity, we control for a quartic in the worker’s ASVAB
percentile score in column (4). Inclusion of the full set of controls reduces the racial wage
gap at white supervisor establishments by roughly 60%. However, although we lose sta-
tistical significance, the wage differences for black workers across supervisor race is only
slightly reduced.28 Our point estimates suggest that the racial wage gap at white supervisor
establishments is around 4.9%, but approximately 9.0% at black supervisor establishments.
We can alternatively control for worker heterogeneity by exploiting the panel nature of
the NLSY97. In columns (5) through (7), we estimate
logWit = βXit + γ2b
e
it + γ3b
w
i b
e
it + ωi + εit, (17)
where Xit is a vector of time-varying controls, and ωi is a worker fixed effect. Here we
identify the supervisor race effect from workers who have worked in both black supervisor
and white supervisor jobs. This strategy would be appropriate if the bias induced by the
unobservable differences in workers who work for supervisors of varying races is less than
the bias induced by the unobservable factors which would cause an individual to accept a
job offer with a supervisor of a different race than before.29 The trade-off is that we have
less power for estimation: only 1,285 of our 1,863 black workers, and 783 of our 3,532 white
workers, have both a black supervisor and white supervisor job spell.
Our within-worker results are consistent with the estimates from our pooled specification.
In column (5) which includes quartics in tenure and potential experience, we observe that
relative to whites, blacks see a 5.2 percent decrease in their wages when moving from an
establishment with a white supervisor to one with a black supervisor. We add state and
year fixed effects in column (6), and state, year, industry, and occupation fixed effects, as
well as our employer characteristics, in column (7). In each of these specifications, γ3, the
27For state fixed effects, we use the state in which the individual was living when they first reported the
job. This is to avoid, for example, recording a job which was terminated due to a move as being in the
state in which the worker recently moved to. Industry fixed effects are 2-digit NAICS (2002) codes, while
occupation fixed effects are 2-digit SOC (2002) codes. We convert the census industry and occupation codes
provided by the NLSY into NAICS and SOC codes using the crosswalk provided by the Census.
28We lose a non-trivial portion of the sample in this specification due to missing ASVAB scores. There is
little difference in our point estimates when we re-estimate columns (1)-(3) excluding those with a missing
ASVAB.
29It is difficult to know how large this bias could be, but workers who have worked in both a white
supervisor and a black supervisor job spell have nearly identical education and ASVAB test scores to those
who have worked only in occupations with a supervisor of one race. This fact, of course, does not rule out
that there could be differences across the two samples in time invariant unobservables, or that time-varying
unobservables differ at the times in which they accept employment with a supervisor of a different race.
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coefficient on the Black Worker-Black Supervisor interaction, remains negative, statistically
significant, and of similar magnitude to the analogous pooled results.
From our model, we also derived predictions on how the correlation between supervisor
race and wages will vary with levels of prejudice in the labor market. For our pooled cross-
sectional approach, we estimate
logWis = βXi + γ1b
w
i + γ2b
e
i + γ3b
w
i b
e
i + γ4ps + γ5b
w
i ps + γ6b
e
ips + γ7b
w
i b
e
ips + εis, (18)
where ps is the prejudice level in state s. As prejudice is normalized to be mean zero,
γ1, γ2, and γ3 represent the same statistics as in (16) for the mean state. The coefficient γ4
represents the rate at which white workers wages with white supervisors changes with a one
standard deviation increase the fraction of prejudiced individuals in a worker’s state, while
γ5 represents the differential effect for black workers with white supervisors. The parameter
γ6 represents the rate at which white workers wages with black supervisors change relative
to white workers with white supervisors as prejudice increases. Finally, γ7 estimates how
black wages with black supervisors change as prejudice increases relative to the rate at which
white wages with black supervisors change.
As with our previous empirical model, there are likely unobservable firm characteristics
that influence wages and are correlated with the race of supervisors. Further, it is likely that
these characteristics differ in areas of the country where there are more or less prejudice. So
long as these characteristics do not have differential effects on black and white workers, they
should be accounted for by γ4 and γ6 (i.e., the prejudice-varying impact of different raced
supervisors on white worker wages.) Our model makes two empirical predictions. First,
γ7 < 0; the supervisor race wage gap among black workers is increasing in the level of local
prejudice (Proposition 3). Second, γ5 +γ7 < 0; black workers with black supervisors in more
prejudiced areas earn less than those in less prejudiced areas (Proposition 2).
We estimate equation (18) in Table 5.30 Column (1) estimates the basic Mincer specifica-
tion. The coefficient on prejudice, which represents the impact of increasing prejudice on the
wages of white workers, is strongly and statistically significantly negative. The interaction
between prejudice and black supervisor, which represents the differential impact of preju-
dice for white workers with black supervisors is positive, though not statistically significant.
There are two likely reasons for these results. First, due to the geographical concentration
of prejudice in the South, prejudice is likely correlated with lower wage economic conditions.
Second, the types of firms which employ black supervisors likely vary with levels of prejudice.
30To allow for errors to be correlated within states, we cluster our standard errors at the state level, which
is the level of variation for prejudice. This approach generally produces more conservative estimates than
clustering at the individual-level.
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For instance, in areas of high prejudice, employing a racially diverse leadership group may
become correlated with other positive business decisions that lead to higher wages. We thus
do not place a strong weight on the interpretation of these variables for analyzing the impact
of prejudice. Our model, however, is concerned with how prejudice impacts black workers.
To the extent that our estimates for white workers capture these unobservable geographic
differences, our tests for black workers should still remain valid.
Turning our attention to the impact on black workers, in column (1) we observe that
prejudice has a negative but statistically insignificant impact on the wages of black workers
with white supervisors. This result is not inconsistent with our model; because black workers
respond to an increase in prejudice by becoming more selective on the job offers they accept
from white supervisor firms, the predicted overall effect on wages is ambiguous. Importantly,
as our model predicts, wages for black workers at black supervisor jobs (γ5+γ7) are decreasing
in prejudice. We also observe some evidence that the “supervisor race gap” (γ7) is increasing,
although this effect is not statistically significant. To control for the geographic concentration
of prejudiced beliefs in part, we add in fixed effects for the nine geographic census divisions in
column (2), and thus our effects are estimated off of variation within states that are in close
geographical proximity to one another.31 These controls have little impact on our results, as
does adding industry, occupation, and employer controls in column (3). Including a quartic
in ASVAB reduces the magnitude of both results; γ5 + γ7 loses statistical significance and γ7
becomes positive but approximately 0.
We include worker fixed effects in columns (5) through (7). Here the impact of prejudice
on workers with white supervisors is identified off of workers who move to a different state.
The interactions with being employed with a black supervisor are identified off of variations in
the magnitude of the change in wages when switching from a white supervisor establishment
to a black supervisor establishment across states with different measured prejudice. In
column (5), which includes only controls for time-varying worker characteristics, the effect
of increasing prejudice on black worker-black supervisor wages (γ5 + γ7) is negative and
significant at the 5% level. This result is robust to including census division and year effects
in column (6) and industry and occupation effects in column (7). The effect of prejudice on
the “supervisor race” wage gap, the triple interaction term, is negative, much larger than
estimated in the pooled cross-section, and statistically significant at the 10% level. This
result too is robust to additional controls in columns (6) and (7).32 Our estimates suggest
31As an additional robustness check, we estimated all of our main results excluding workers in the South
which has, by far, the highest levels of prejudice. The magnitudes of our results are nearly universally
stronger, although they are estimated with less precision. These results are available upon request.
32One concern is that, as our main results are identified off of only workers who move to a different state
or work under jobs with supervisors of different races, our stronger results are due to a change in the sample
22
that a one standard deviation increase in prejudice, which roughly corresponds to moving
from the Mountain division to the East North Central, leads to a 8% decrease in the accepted
wages of black workers at establishments with black supervisors, and a 6 percentage point
widening of the observed wage gap between black workers with white supervisors and black
workers with black supervisors.
4.2 Job Stability
Our model makes a separate prediction on job stability by supervisor race. As jobs with
black supervisors offer black workers less exposure to prejudice than jobs with white super-
visors, we expect these jobs to have greater job stability (Proposition 4). To investigate this
relationship, we calculate the total duration of each job-worker match, to create a sample of
jobs rather than job-years.
In our model, employment durations last at most two periods, and there is only one
opportunity for a prejudiced employer to terminate the relationship. In reality, an employer
has many opportunities to terminate employment, and thus, a worker’s belief about an
employer may be constantly evolving. Since black workers are more selective on the jobs
they accept with white supervisors, it is possible that long-standing black worker-white
supervisor matches may be more stable; their historical stability is evidence that they are
not prejudiced.33 Therefore, we focus on short-run job stability, where our model is more
applicable. Specifically, we define a job as stable if it lasts more than one year. We drop any
jobs which we observe for less than one year and do not observe an end date (due to either
attrition or because the job lasted beyond the 2008 survey); this amounts to less than 9%
of our sample. Given that our workers are in their early-career, job durations are relatively
short. Only 55% of our sample of 13,306 jobs last more than one year.
We estimate a linear probability model,
Zi = βXi + γ1b
w
i + γ2b
e
i + γ3b
w
i b
e
i + εi (19)
where Zi is an indicator for whether job i lasted more than one year and Xi is a vector of job-
and worker-specific controls.34 Again, while we expect that unobservable firm characteristics
which may influence job stability are correlated with the likelihood of employing a black
relative to the pooled cross-sections. However, this does not appear to be the case. Estimating our model
without worker fixed effects on the sample of workers who move states or work jobs with supervisors of
different races yields nearly identical results to the full sample.
33It would, thus, not be appropriate to estimate a proportional hazard model in this case, as the hazard
function would depend on worker and supervisor race.
34Results from probit and logit models are similar.
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supervisor, these will be captured by γ2 provided they do not affect black and white workers
differently.35 Our model predicts that γ1 > 0 and γ3 < 0. Blacks have less stable employment
with white supervisors as these firms are more likely to take prejudiced action against them.
We show the results of this estimation in Table 6. The results support our model. In
column (1), with only a basic set of worker controls, we observe that black workers with
white supervisors are 8.1 percentage points less likely to remain employed after one year
than whites with white supervisors. While all workers have more job stability at black
supervisor establishments, black workers gain 4.2 percentage points in job stability more
than whites. Both of our main results are statistically significant. These results are robust
to including state and start year fixed effects in column (2). Industry, occupation, and
employer characteristic controls, which we include in column (3), can explain almost all of
the increased job stability for white workers with black supervisors. However, our estimate
for the stability gain for black supervisors actually increases in magnitude.36 Our results
remain consistent once accounting for differences in cognitive test scores in column (4).
With the full set of controls, our cross-sectional results imply that black workers with white
supervisors are 7.1 percentage points less likely to remain employed after 1 year than white
workers. However, black workers with black supervisors gain 5.7 percentage points more in
job stability than similar whites when working at a black supervisor establishment.
We include worker fixed effects in columns (5)-(7). The effect of supervisor race is thus
identified off of differences in job stability within workers on job spells with different raced
supervisors. Given that only roughly 38% of our workers worked at both a black supervisor
and white supervisor establishment, our estimates are substantially less precise than in the
pooled cross-section approach. We see little evidence for our model in the basic specification
or including state and year fixed effects. Once we include occupation, industry, and employer
characteristic controls in column (7) our point estimate is of only slightly smaller magnitude
to what we observed in the pooled cross-sections, although it is not statistically significant.
Our model generates one final set of predictions on the interaction between job stability
and prejudice. As prejudice increases, black workers’ jobs become less stable regardless
of supervisor race. Jobs with white supervisors become less stable as prejudice directly
influences their stability (Proposition 8). Jobs with black supervisors become less stable
because blacks lower their reservation match quality as employment opportunities decrease
35This will also capture the fact that our measure of having a black supervisor is correlated with job
duration by construction.
36Workers sometimes report changes in occupation and industry during a job spell. We use fixed effects
for the first occupation and industry which they report.
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(Proposition 7). Following the same strategy as before, in Table 7 we estimate,
Zi = βXi + γ1b
w
i + γ2b
e
i + γ3b
w
i b
e
i + γ4ps + γ5b
w
i ps + γ6b
e
ips + γ7b
w
i b
e
ips + εis (20)
where our predictions are γ5 < 0 and γ5 + γ7 < 0. We find support for the second hypoth-
esis in the pooled cross-section. Once we control for industry, occupation, and employer
characteristics in column (3), we see a strong and statistically significant negative effect of
prejudice on the stability of black worker-black supervisor matches. Including controls for
ASVAB scores in column (4) does not substantially affect this result. Our estimates suggest
that increasing the level of prejudice by one standard deviation, which amounts to moving
from the Mountain division to the East North Central, would lead to a 5.7 percentage point
decrease in the probability that black workers with black supervisors would remain in their
job for at least one year (relative to whites). When we include worker fixed effects in columns
(5)-(7) we lose statistical significance but actually see a non-trivial increase in the magnitude
of the effect. We find little support for the first hypothesis. The estimated effect of prejudice
on black-worker white supervisor job stability ranges from zero to small and positive, and is
never significant.
To check the robustness of our results to different definitions of job stability, we estimate
(19) and (20) for every value of job duration between 60 and 720 days, in 30 day intervals.
We display the point estimates of interest for the cross-sectional specification with a full set
of controls in Figures 2 and 3, respectively.37 While not always statistically significant at
conventional levels, the point estimates have the correct sign for almost every definition.
4.3 Robustness
Since supervisor race is calculated at the job spell level, longer job spells are more likely
to be categorized as black supervisor jobs. One concern then is that our supervisor race
effects are simply proxying for the characteristics of jobs which make them more stable.
Given our identification strategy, this is only a problem if these characteristics affect black
workers differently than whites. Nonetheless, in Appendix C.1, we investigate the robustness
of our results to identifying a job’s supervisor race based on the first reported supervisor,
which eliminates the constructed correlation between job stability and supervisor race but
increases measurement error and the reporting bias towards white supervisors, and directly
controlling for the completed length of the job spell. These results are consistent with our
37To produce a confidence interval for γ5 + γ7, we estimate a regression including a Black X White
Supervisor and Black X Black Supervisor interaction (rather than a Black indicator and Black X Black
Supervisor interaction), and use the standard error from the latter estimate.
25
main findings.
Our constructed measure of prejudice provides an interval-scaled measure of employer
prejudice provided that the fraction of individuals who give a prejudiced response to each of
the questions we use is linearly related to the fraction of prejudiced employers in a state.38
We could alternatively measure prejudice using only a single question which would be correct
under the weaker assumption that that question is linearly related to the fraction of preju-
diced employers. However, the measurement error problem will be more severe, suggesting
that the results will be further attenuated. In Appendix C.2, we estimate our main results
under 9 different measures of prejudice from the GSS, including the individual questions
that make up our factor analysis. Regardless of the question we use, our point estimates
maintain the correct sign, and many are statistically significant.39 This suggests that our
model would be confirmed by nearly any way we construct a prejudice measure from the
underlying GSS data.
It is possible that the lower job stability we observe for black workers at white supervisor
firms is in fact a positive if, for instance, these firms provide better networks and workers are
able to quickly find higher wage opportunities outside the firm. To test this, we estimated
the impact of supervisor race on the wages of the next job a worker accepts. We find no
significant relationship, suggesting this is not the case.40
4.4 Alternative Explanations
While we posit the source of prejudice in our model is employers, many of our results can
be derived from a model in which workers had a taste for same-race management. If racial
tastes drive worker decisions, then such conditions can pose problems for our identification
strategy. The estimated effect of working at a black supervisor establishment on white
worker wages would reflect both unobservable establishment-level differences and a premium
that must be paid to whites to overcome their distaste. However, it is not clear that such
a model would imply that the gap in wages by supervisor race for black workers would
be increasing in prejudice. Likewise, if black workers had higher job stability with black
supervisor establishments because of the worker’s taste for same-race supervisors, it would
seem to us that job stability at these firms should be increasing in prejudice, rather than
decreasing, as the unprejudiced job opportunities outside the firm diminish. Nonetheless, we
38We note that having an interval-scaled measure of prejudice is important, as it is nearly impossible to
make cross-group comparisons with ordinal data (Bond and Lang, 2013a; 2014).
396 out of 9 measures produce a statistically significant negative relationship between black worker-black
supervisor wages and prejudice. This number is 5 out of 9 for the supervisor race wage gap, and 2 out of 9
for the relationship between prejudice and black worker-black supervisor job stability.
40These results are available upon request.
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do not rule out that it may be possible to construct a model based on worker tastes which
allows this seemingly contradictory conclusion.
If workers tastes are important, however, it should also be that the actual race of the
supervisor matters within a job spell. If a black worker is moved from a black supervisor to a
white supervisor, they should require a wage increase to compensate them for their distaste.
As we observe 610 job spells in which a worker’s supervisor changes race, we can test this
in the data. We conduct this test in Table 8 by including job fixed effects.41 We find no
evidence to support the idea that tastes for supervisor race within a job are important. Our
point estimate for the effect on a black worker of switching to a black supervisor, is negative,
but small and statistically insignificant. The estimate for white workers is almost exactly
zero, suggesting that our identification strategy is not confounded by white worker tastes.
In columns (3) and (4), we include an interaction between supervisor race and prejudice.
While the point estimates suggest that tastes for supervisors may be important within a job
for white workers in high prejudice areas, they are imprecisely estimated and statistically
indistinguishable from zero.42
In addition, our empirical findings cannot be easily explained by conventional statisti-
cal discrimination models.43 If firms with a strong black leadership presence are better at
evaluating minority candidates, black workers may end up experiencing a lower turnover
rate in these firms. However, the same differences in observability of skill or match quality
would also suggest that highly-skilled black workers would be reluctant to apply to white
supervisor firms; workers with positive difficult-to-observables should select into employers
who are best able to observe these factors. Such reluctance would lead to a negative selection
of black workers into these jobs, and thus, lower wages for black workers in firms with white
supervisors.44 Moreover, for a statistical model to generate both higher wages and higher
turnover at white supervisor firms, it must be that black workers in these jobs have both
higher average productivity (higher wages) and a higher variance of productivity (more bad
matches and terminations) than workers at black supervisor jobs. In Figure 4, we plot the
41Note that our overall sample size is reduced by 15%, since here we do not measure supervisor race at the
job-spell level. This reflects years in which we do not observe the race of the supervisor, or that the worker
has a non-black, non-white supervisor.
42We also note that, given the way our prejudice variable is scaled, the point estimates suggest that white
workers have a taste for opposite race supervisors everywhere in the United States outside of the South.
43Of course if idiosyncratic match quality is important for productivity, as it is in our model, white
supervisor firms may believe that black workers who apply to these jobs must be better matches as they
would otherwise be unwilling to take on the risk associated with a possibly prejudice firm, and thus they
statistically discriminate in their favor. At its core, we view this scenario as equivalent to the model we
present in this paper.
44See Hensvik (2014) who presents evidence consistent with this phenomenon for women in organizations
with a large share of female managers.
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densities of ASVAB percentile scores for each worker-supervisor job pairing and demonstrate
that we do not observe such patterns in our data. While the average percentile scores of
black workers at white supervisor firms are higher, the variance of the distribution is identical
and there is little discernible difference in the shape of the density curves.45 Hence, although
statistical discrimination remains an important explanation for racial wage disparities in the
labor market, it does not appear to offer an explanation for our findings on wages and job
stability.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a search model where some employers hold prejudices that are
unobservable to workers. Workers instead observe a signal of an employer’s prejudice status,
the presence of a black supervisor. Since prejudiced employers have a biased retention policy,
these jobs present less option value to black workers. Thus, they have lower reservation wages
(or match quality signal) for employment when they can observe a black supervisor. This
effect leads to lower wages overall and less job stability, but blacks still have relatively more
stable matches when employed at a firm with a black supervisor. Increasing the level of
prejudice decreases the value of search for black workers. This leads black workers to adopt
lower reservation wages for jobs with black supervisors, causing these matches to have both
lower wages and less job stability. It also decreases the value of employment with white
supervisors, leading black workers to be more selective on the types of white supervisor jobs
they accept. Thus, while white supervisor jobs become less stable as prejudice increases,
the accepted wages actually increase relative to the wages accepted by workers with black
supervisors. We confirmed the main predictions of our model using longitudinal data on job
spells with information on supervisor race, matched with data on levels of local prejudice.
Our results show that asymmetric information regarding employer prejudice can have
important labor market consequences, which suggests that firms that are not prejudiced
should be willing to invest in communicating this information to prospective black employees.
Because of data limitations, we were only able to look at one possible signal, which we
assumed was exogenous. The optimal adoption of signals, such as affirmative action in
promotion and hiring, remains an open question. Developing models of firm organizational
practices under asymmetric information about prejudice and identifying data which could
test these models presents an important direction for future research.
45It is also unclear why prejudice would matter in a model in which wage disparities are entirely statistical.
This could be the case if, for instance, black workers were on average lower skilled in areas of high prejudice.
While the average ASVAB percentile score is lower in high-prejudice states, we do not see evidence that it
is disproportionately lower for blacks.
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Although measured racial prejudice in the United States has declined substantially over
the last few decades, our paper demonstrates that the remaining prejudice and uncertainty
about which firms hold these racial prejudices, can still have significant negative effects on
black employment outcomes. Even when prejudice is not pervasive, the threat of prejudice,
and the inability to identify employers who possess it, causes black workers to select into
worse job opportunities with the unprejudiced employers they can identify.
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A Theoretical Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Main Results
This appendix proves the main results of our paper. As we show in the text, blacks and whites follow the
same search strategy for period 2 jobs, and period 2 black reservation wages are independent of supervisor
race. Further, as there are only two types of jobs and all bad matches that were accepted in period 1 are
terminated voluntarily in period 2, all jobs that we observe in period 2 that began in period 1 have the same
wage. Thus, the outcomes for whites, blacks with black supervisors, and blacks with white supervisors in
period 2 are always identical. We therefore will focus our proofs on search strategies for period 1 jobs.
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. First note that qrbw1 > q
rbb
1 since pis > 0. Thus the expressions have the same numerator, but q
rbb
1 has
a larger denominator. Since the observed wages in period 1 are simply the expected value of the distribution
truncated at the reservation wage, the distributions are identical across supervisor race, and white supervisor
jobs have a higher truncation point, the distribution of white supervisor job wages first order stochastically
dominates that of black supervisor job wages and thus has a higher mean.
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Differentiating (12) with respect to p,
∂qrbb1
∂p
=
−sω ´ 1h
ω
1− F (q′)dq′
(2ω − h) ,
which is strictly less than zero. As the reservation wage is decreasing in prejudice, the distribution of wages
can be stochastically ordered.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Applying the uniform distribution, we can write the reservation wages for each supervisor race cate-
gory as
qrbb1 =
1
2ω − h
[
h+
1
2
ω(1− ps)(1− h
ω
)2
]
qrbw1 =
1
(2ω − h)− pis(ω − h)
[
h+
1
2
ω(1− ps)(1− h
ω
)2
]
,
It then follows from uniformity that the difference in average wages is
¯qbw1 − q¯bb1 =
ω + qrbw1
2
− ω + q
rbb
1
2
=
1
2
(qrbw1 − qrbb1 ).
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to prejudice,
∂ ¯(qbw1 − ¯qbb1 )
∂p
=
1
2
(
∂qrbw1
∂p
− ∂q
rbb
1
∂p
),
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where,
∂qrbw1
∂p
=
∂pi
∂p s(ω − h)
[
h+ 12ω(1− ps)(1− hω )2
]
[(2ω − h)− pis(ω − h)]2 −
sω(1− hω )2
2 [(2ω − h)− pis(ω − h)]
∂qrbb1
∂p
= −sω(1−
h
ω )
2
2(2ω − h)
∂pi
∂p
=
(1− s)(1− b)
[(1− b)(1− p) + p(1− s)]2 .
This expression simplifies to
∂ ¯(qbw1 − ¯qbb1 )
∂p
=
1
2
Ω2 [Λ3 + Λ4] ,
where,
Ω2 =
s(1− s)(ω − h)
2 [(1− b)(1− p) + p(1− s)]2 (2ω − h)[(2ω − h)− pis(ω − h)]2
Λ3 = 2(2ω − h)(1− b)h+ ωs2p2(1− s)(ω − h)(1− h
ω
)2
Λ4 = ω(2ω − h)(1− h
ω
)2
[
(1− 2ps)(1− b)− p2(b− s)] .
Note that since ω > h ≥ 0 and b < 1, p < 1, s < 1,Ω2 and Λ3 are both strictly positive. By inspection, Λ4 is
positive so long as (1 − b)(1 − 2ps) > p2s(b − s) and is thus a sufficient condition to guarantee the overall
sign of the derivative is positive.
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. A job with match signal q and a black supervisor lasts two periods whenever it is a good match,
which occurs with probability q. For jobs with a white supervisor, the job must be both a good match and
the employer must not terminate the worker due to prejudice. This occurs with probability (1− q)(1− pis).
Imposing the uniform distribution and integrating over the distribution of accepted jobs, black supervisor
jobs last longer provided
1 + qrbb1
2
≥ 1 + q
rbw
1
2
(1− pis),
substituting for the reservation wages (derived for the uniform distribution in the proof of proposition 3)
and multiplying both sides by 2,
1 +
1
2ω − h
[
h+
1
2
ω(1− ps)(1− h
ω
)2
]
≥
(
1 +
1
(2ω − h)− pis(ω − h)
[
h+
1
2
ω(1− ps)(1− h
ω
)2
])
(1− pis),
which simplifies to [
h+
1
2
ω(1− ps)(1− h
ω
)2
] [
1
2ω − h −
(1− pis)
(2ω − h)− pis(ω − h)
]
≥ −pis.
the right-hand side of the inequality is negative, while the left-hand side is positive since,
(2ω − h)− (ω − h)pis > (2ω − h)− (2ω − h)pis
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A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Black workers’ job stabilities are monotonic functions of their reservation wage, thus it is sufficient
to differentiate (12) with respect to p,
∂qrbb1
∂p
=
−sω ´ 1h
ω
1− F (q′)dq′
(2ω − h) ,
which is strictly less than zero.
A.1.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The probability of a job accepted with a white supervisor lasting two periods is the probability that
a job is a good match multiplied by the probability that the worker will not be terminated by prejudice.
Given the uniform distribution of job offers, this amounts to
1 + qrbw1
2
(1− pis).
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to p,
1
2
[
−∂pi
∂p
s+
∂qrbw1 (1− pis)
∂p
]
.
The first term represents the change in the probability of a match lasting two periods at the upper-bound
(q = 1), which is negative since ∂pi∂p > 0. The second term represents the change in probability of the match
lasting two periods at the reservation match quality. This term must also be negative. Suppose not, and
that the reservation match quality become more stable when p increased. Given that ∂pi∂p > 0, this could
only happen when qrbw1 increases in p (which is possible). However, this would imply that both q
rbw
1 and
(1−pis)qrbw1 has increased, and thus the total value of employment at the reservation match quality V bw1 (qrbb1 )
has also increased. But, V bw1 (q
rbb
1 ) = h+ U
b
2 . Taking the derivative of (10),
∂U b2
∂p
= −s
ˆ 1
h
ω
1− F (q′)dq′
which is strictly less than zero. Thus, we have a contradiction.
A.1.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Comparing (7) to (12), note that white workers have a higher reservation match quality than black
workers with black supervisors. Since f(q) does not vary across race, the distribution of accepted match
qualities for white workers will stochastically dominate that for black workers with black supervisors. As q
directly determines both wages and job stabilities, whites will have higher wages and more stable jobs than
blacks with black supervisors.
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A.1.8 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Under the uniform distribution, white supervisor jobs are always less stable for black workers than
black supervisor jobs (Proposition 4). Since black workers with black supervisors have less job stability
than whites (Proposition 7) it then follows that black workers with white supervisors will also have less job
stability.
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B Data Appendix
B.1 GSS Prejudice Measures
Here we list the exact wording and coding of the questions we used to measure prejudice in the general social
survey
B.1.1 Lack Will
The variable RACDIF4 asks, “On the average African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing
than white people. Do you think these differences are because most African Americans just don’t have the
motivation or willpower to pull themselves up out of poverty?” Respondents could choose ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ We
coded ‘Yes’ answers as prejudiced responses. The question was asked in every survey from 1996-2010.
B.1.2 No Discrimination
The variable RACDIF1 asks, “On the average African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than
white people. Do you think these differences are mainly due to discrimination?” Respondents could choose
‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ We coded ‘Yes’ answers as prejudiced responses. This question was asked in every survey from
1996-2010.
B.1.3 Oppose Marriage
The variable MARBLK asks, “How about having a close relative or family member marry a black person?
Would you be very in favor of it happening, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed to it hap-
pening, somewhat opposed or very opposed to it happening?” Respondents could choose ‘Strongly Favor,’
‘Favor,’ ‘Neither favor nor oppose,’ ‘Oppose,’ or ‘Strongly Oppose.’ We coded ’Strongly Oppose’ answers as
prejudiced responses. The question was asked in every survey from 1998-2010.
B.1.4 Inborn Differences
The variable RACDIF2 asks, “On the average African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than
white people. Do you think these differences are because most African Americans have less in-born ability
to learn?” Respondents could choose ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ We coded ‘Yes’ answers as prejudiced responses. The
question was asked in each survey from 1996-2010.
B.1.5 Against Housing Laws
The variable RACOPEN asks, “Suppose there is a community-wide vote on the general housing issue. There
are two possible laws to vote on. One law says that a homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his
house to, even if he prefers not to sell to African Americans. The second law says that a homeowner cannot
refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color. Which law would you vote for?” Respondents
could choose ‘A homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his house to, even if he prefers not to sell
to African Americans,’ ‘A homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color,’ or
‘Neither.’ We coded the first response as prejudiced. This question was asked in the 1996 survey, and again
from 2004-2010.
B.1.6 Lazy
The variable WORKBLKS asks, “I’m going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics
of [Blacks] can be rated... A score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in the group are
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[hard-working]. A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group are [lazy]. A score of 4
means that you think that the group is not towards one end or another, and of course you may choose any
number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.” Respondents can
choose a number between 1-7. We coded answers of 6 or greater as prejudiced responses. This question was
asked in every survey from 1996-2010.
B.1.7 Favor Anti-Miscegenation Laws
The variable RACMAR asks, “Do you think there should be laws against marriages between African-
Americans and whites?” Respondents could choose ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ We coded ‘Yes’ answers as prejudiced
responses. This question was asked in each survey from 1996-2002.
B.1.8 Against Black President
The variable RACPRES asks, “If your party nominated an African-American for President, would you vote
for him if he were qualified for the job?” Respondents could choose ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ We coded ‘No’ responses
as prejudiced responses. The question was asked in the 1996, 2008 and 2010 surveys.
B.1.9 Smart
The variable INTLBLKS asks, “I’m going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics
of [Blacks] can be rated... A score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in the group are
[unintelligent]. A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group are [intelligent]. A score of
4 means that you think that the group is not towards one end or another, and of course you may choose
any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.” Respondents can
choose a number between 1-7. We coded answers of 2 or less as prejudiced responses. This question was
asked in every survey from 1996-2010.
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C Empirical Appendix
C.1 Supervisor Race and Job Stability Correlation
In Table C1 we test the sensitivity of our wage and job stability results to specifications in which this bias may
be less severe. In columns (1) and (2), we control for the total length of the job spell in a regression on wages.
While this should eliminate the concerns about the bias of our supervisor race measure, it is an over-control
in the sense that well matched jobs will necessarily be both high wage and more stable. Nonetheless, all of
our model’s predictions hold under these specifications. In columns (3) and (4), we estimate wage regressions
which use only the race of the first reported supervisor of the job spell to classify the establishment. This
removes the potential bias, but increases measurement error which should attenuate our results. While our
coefficients of interest are not statistically significant, they maintain the correct sign. Columns (5) and (6)
repeat (3) and (4), but instead looking at job stability. The estimated magnitudes are similar to those in
our main specification.
C.2 Alternative Measures of Prejudice
To test the sensitivity of our results to the individual components of our prejudice measure, in the first
four columns of Table C2 we estimate our fixed effect wage specification using the individual questions as
measures of prejudice directly. The columns use, in order, believe that blacks lag whites due to lack of will,
do not believe blacks lag whites due to discrimination, oppose the marriage of a close relative to a black
individual, and believe that blacks lag whites due to inborn disability . The responses are scaled to be mean
0, standard deviation 1 across states, to ease comparison with the factor analysis results. Reassuringly, the
choice of question does not appear to be of great importance for our result. Black worker-black supervisor
wages are decreasing in prejudice for all of the questions we use to construct our measure, and significantly so
for two out of the four questions. The “supervisor race wage gap” for black workers is increasing in prejudice
for every question as well, and statistically significant for all but the “no discrimination” question.
In columns (5) through (9) we measure prejudice through five additional questions we did not use, due
to smaller samples, difficulty in interpreting the question, and less dispersion in the data: opposition to
open housing laws, belief that blacks are lazy, support for anti-miscegenation laws, refusal to vote for black
presidential candidates, and a belief that blacks are not intelligent. These questions yield similar conclusions.
Our result on the supervisor race wage gap is significant for 2 out of these 5 variables, while our result for
black supervisor-black worker wages is statistically significant for four.
In Table C3, we repeat this exercise using the cross-sectional specification on job stability. While our
results are weaker than for wages, they always maintain the correct sign. Although black worker-black
supervisor job stability is only statistically significantly decreasing in prejudice for the “no discrimination”
and marriage questions, we see similar magnitudes for the questions on “lack of will,” belief that blacks are
lazy, and support for anti-miscegenation laws.
Taken together, while we cannot be certain under which questions our assumptions are satisfied, given
the general consistency of results, the results of Tables C2 and C3 suggest that if our assumptions hold for
any question in the GSS than our theory would likely be confirmed by a precise measure of state-wide rates
of employment prejudice. Moreover, nearly any way in which we construct a measure of prejudice from the
General Social Survey will yield results supportive of our model.
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Figure 1: Model Timing Structure
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Figure 2: Effect of Black Supervisor on Black Stability - Alternative Durations
Point estimates and 90% confidence interval for estimate of γ5 + γ7 under different job length definitions of
job stability. Points were estimated at 30 day intervals. Regressions included controls for gender, education,
industry and occupation fixed effects, whether the employer offered health insurance, whether the employer
offered any benefits, union membership, and quartic terms in starting potential experience and ASVAB
percentile score.
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Figure 3: Effect of Prejudice Black Supervisor-Black Worker Job Stability - Alternative
Durations
Point estimates and 90% confidence interval for estimate of γ5 + γ7 under different job length definitions of
job stability. Points were estimated at 30 day intervals. Regressions included controls for gender, education,
industry and occupation fixed effects, whether the employer offered health insurance, whether the employer
offered any benefits, union membership, and quartic terms in starting potential experience and ASVAB
percentile score.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Black Worker ASVAB Percentile Scores by Supervisor Race
Kernel density estimates of ASVAB percentile scores for black workers by supervisor race.
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Table 1: White Prejudice by Census Division
Census Division
Northeast Midwest South West
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Lack Will 0.38 0.46 0.51 0.40 0.55 0.63 0.57 0.41 0.40
No Discrimination 0.59 0.65 0.69 0.64 0.73 0.79 0.77 0.61 0.65
Oppose Marriage 0.12 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.44 0.32 0.15 0.11
Inborn Differences 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.07
Prejudice -1.08 -0.11 0.20 -0.67 0.69 1.75 1.06 -0.82 -0.87
(0.63) (0.52) (0.38) (0.76) (0.76) (0.45) (0.76) (0.50) (0.19)
Observations 393 1023 1412 619 1355 501 736 622 988
Average of de-trended fraction of individuals in each state by division for the combined 1996-2010 waves
of the General Social Survey who reported each belief. Prejudice is first factor from principal factor analysis,
normalized to be mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across states. Standard deviations in parenthesis. See
Appendix B for details of the data construction.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - Worker Race
(1) (2) (3)
Total White Black
Log Wage 7.17 7.23 7.07
(0.44) (0.44) (0.40)
Education 13.26 13.40 12.99
(2.32) (2.36) (2.22)
Female 0.46 0.44 0.50
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Potential Experience 3.96 3.79 4.32
(2.73) (2.67) (2.80)
Tenure 2.01 2.09 1.86
(1.72) (1.77) (1.61)
ASVAB 0.46 0.54 0.30
(0.28) (0.27) (0.23)
Black Supervisor 0.23 0.08 0.54
(0.42) (0.27) (0.50)
Lack Will 0.50 0.48 0.53
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
No Discrimination 0.69 0.67 0.72
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Against Marriage 0.24 0.22 0.27
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Inborn Differences 0.10 0.10 0.10
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Prejudice 0.19 0.04 0.51
(0.82) (0.78) (0.80)
Observations 27660 18251 9409
Descriptive statistics by worker race. Each
observation is a job-year. Standard deviations in
parenthesis. Observations are weighted by days
they were worked in that year. See Appendix B
for description of prejudice measures.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics - Supervisor Race
(1) (2)
White Black
Log Wage 7.19 7.11
(0.44) (0.43)
Education 13.33 13.05
(2.34) (2.26)
Female 0.45 0.50
(0.50) (0.50)
Potential Experience 3.89 4.22
(2.71) (2.76)
Tenure 1.97 2.15
(1.70) (1.78)
ASVAB 0.50 0.35
(0.27) (0.27)
Black 0.20 0.77
(0.40) (0.42)
Lack Will 0.49 0.53
(0.08) (0.08)
No Discrimination 0.68 0.72
(0.07) (0.08)
Against Marriage 0.23 0.27
(0.09) (0.10)
Inborn Differences 0.10 0.10
(0.03) (0.03)
Prejudice 0.10 0.52
(0.80) (0.81)
Observations 21505 6155
Descriptive statistics by supervisor race
measure. Each observation is a job-year.
Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Observations are weighted by days they
were worked in that year. See Appendix B
for description of prejudice measures.
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Table 8: Within Job Spell Supervisor Race Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage
Black Supervisor -0.000 -0.002 -0.015 -0.019
(0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.027)
Black X Black Supervisor -0.015 -0.015 0.001 0.003
(0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.036)
Prejudice X Black Supervisor 0.044 0.051
(0.042) (0.042)
Prejudice X Black X Black Supervisor -0.046 -0.053
(0.051) (0.049)
Job FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Characteristics No Yes No Yes
Occupation FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 23843 23657 23433 23251
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. Worker characteristics include
quartic terms in potential experience and tenure. Industry FE are 2-digit (2002) NAICS codes.
Occupation FE are 2-digit (2002) SOC codes. *p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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